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ABSTRACT: Big data has a very important role in the digital economy, because firms 
have accurate tools to collect, store, analyse, treat, monetise and disseminate volumi-
nous amounts of data. Companies have been improving their revenues with informa-
tion about the behaviour, preferences, needs, expectations, desires and evaluations of 
their consumers. In this sense, data could be considered as a productive input.
The article focuses on the current discussion regarding the possible use of competition 
law and policy to address privacy concerns related to big data companies. The most 
traditional and powerful tool to deal with privacy concerns is personal data protection 
law. Notwithstanding, the article examines whether competition law should play an 
important role in data-driven markets where privacy is a key factor. 
The article suggests a new approach to the following antitrust concepts in cases related 
to big data platforms: assessment of market power, merger notification thresholds, 
measurement of merger effects on consumer privacy, and investigation of abuse of 
dominant position. 
In this context, the article analyses decisions of competition agencies which reviewed 
mergers in big data-driven markets, such as Google/DoubleClick, Facebook/
WhatsApp and Microsoft/LinkedIn.
It also reviews investigations of alleged abuse of dominant position associated with big 
data, in particular the proceeding opened by the Bundeskartellamt against Facebook, 
in which the German antitrust authority prohibited the data processing policy 
imposed by Facebook on its users.
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The article concludes that it is important to harmonise the enforcement of compe-
tition, consumer and data protection polices in order to choose the proper way to 
protect the users of dominant platforms, maximising the benefits of the data-driven 
economy.
KEYWORDS: Big Data, competition law, digital economy, privacy, abuse of dominant 
position.
1. Big data: meaning and economic impact 
Big data is a theme of multidisciplinary interest, which is why many scien-
tific research areas such as computer science, business administration, law 
and economics are studying its implications. 
On account of this characteristic, there are multiple definitions for big 
data. Italian scholars of computer science have analysed 1437 abstracts of 
documents in different areas of knowledge mentioning the expression “Big 
Data” in multiple perspectives. They have coined the following definition:
“Big data represents the information assets characterized by such a high 
volume, velocity and variety to require specific technology and analytical 
methods for its transformation into value”.1
The European Commission, in its Communication concerning data-
driven economy, has established an official definition as follows: 
“The term ‘Big Data’ refers to large amounts of different types of data 
produced with high velocity from a high number of various types of 
sources. Handling today’s highly variable and real-time datasets requires 
new tools and methods, such as powerful processors, software and algo-
rithms, going beyond traditional ‘data mining’ tools designed to handle 
mainly low variety, small scale and static datasets, often manually”.2
1 Andrea de Mauro, Mauro Greco and Micheli Grimaldi,  “What is big data? A consensual 
definition and a review of a key research topics”, 4th International Conference on Integrated 
Information,  2014, 10, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265775800_What_is_Big_
Data_A_Consensual_Definition_and_a_Review_of_Key_Research_Topics.
2 European Commission, Towards a Thriving Data-Driven Economy, COM (2014) 442, July 2, 2014, 
4, https://ec.europa.eu/digitalagenda/en/news/communication-data-driven-economy.
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In this context, instead of just establishing a single definition for big 
data, it is important to explain its meaning. Indeed, the role of data in 
the economy has undergone substantial modification over the years. There 
was an exponential increase in the amount of data stored as a result of 
technological development, a greater ease in obtaining and analysing data, 
and a rise in the importance given to data by companies. 
Therefore, it is relevant to emphasise the fundamental importance of 
technology.3 Computer storage capacity has been increasing year by year, 
as well as the improvement of data transmission mechanisms. 
In other words, advances in computer technology are enabling the stor-
age of increasingly larger amounts of data and allowing data to be col-
lected, stored, processed, analysed and transmitted more quickly and effi-
ciently than ever.4 
Notwithstanding, big data is not only a matter of how much information 
firms can collect and store, but also of how it is used. Companies can make 
better predictions and decisions, making more-effective interventions in 
the market. Replacing intuition with data and rigour makes it possible for 
these firms to be much more agile than their competitors.5 
Most authors highlight characteristics of big data starting with letter V. 
A very influential paper featured five data “Vs”: volume, velocity, variety, 
verifiability and value.6
The best known of these characteristics is volume, due to the very high 
amount of data that can be collected and processed. As previously empha-
sised, technology has facilitated not only the storage of data, but also its 
transmission. 
However, the variety of data is also very important because it allows 
companies to explore advertising and develop new products and services. 
3 Danah Boyd and Kate Crawford, “Six provocations for big data”, in A Decade in Internet Time, 
Symposium on the Dynamics of the Internet and Society, September 21, 2011, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1926431.
4 Scientists estimated that the world’s capacity to store information is 295 exabytes in a study pub-
lished in 2011. See: Martin Hilbert and Priscila López. “The world’s technological capacity to store, 
communicate, and compute information”, Science 332, no. 6025 (2011): 60-65, http://science.sci-
encemag.org/content/332/6025/60.full.
5 Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson, “Big data: The management revolution”,  Harvard 
Business Review 90, no. 10 (2012): 60-68. 
6 Allen P. Grunes and Maurice E. Stucke, “No mistake about it: The important role of antitrust in 
the era of big data”, University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper no. 269 (2015). https://ssrn.
com/abstract=2600051. 
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Another important aspect is verifiability: the capability to verify the 
veracity and accuracy of the data collected. This is of great importance to 
avoid drawing the wrong conclusions from the data collected.7
The speed of the collection, storage, analysis and transmission of data is 
also of vital importance. Consequently, velocity is another characteristic 
that enhances the role of data in a digital economy. 
Finally, the characteristic that effectively enhances the role of data in the 
digital economy is its (enormous and rising) value.
Big data has a very important role in the digital economy, because firms 
have accurate tools to collect, store, analyse, treat, monetise and dissemi-
nate large amounts of data.
Companies have been improving their revenues with information on 
the behaviour, preferences, needs, expectations, desires and evaluations8 
of their consumers. In this sense, data could be considered as a productive 
input.
The European Commission estimates that 100,000 new data-related jobs 
will be created in Europe by 2020,9 and that the use of big data by the top 
100 EU manufacturers alone could lead to savings worth EUR 425 billion.10
The phenomenon is not recent, but has of course grown due to the inten-
sive use of ecommerce and the variety of new services typical of the digi-
tal economy. Additionally, it is important to refer the decreasing cost for 
obtaining data and the increasing value that its analysis adds to business.11 
There are multiple uses for personal data, which are precious not only for 
target advertising, but also for the improvement of services and products 
offered. Customer reviews, for example, are very useful for the develop-
ment of new services and products.12
7 Javier Andreu et al., “Big data for health”, IEEE Journal of Biomedical and Health Informatics 19, 
no. 4 (2015): 1193-1208. 
8 Federico Morando, Iemma Raimondo and Emilio Raiteri, “Privacy evaluation: What empirical 
research on users’ valuation of personal data tells us”, Internet Policy Review 3, no. 2 (2014), https://
policyreview.info/articles/analysis/privacy-evaluation-what-empirical-research-users-valuation-
personal-data-tells-uu. 
9 European Commission, Fact Sheet Data cPPP, https://ec.europa.eu/research/industrial_tech-
nologies/pdf/factsheet-cppp_en.pdf. 
10 European Commission, The EU Data Protection Reform and Big Data, March 2016, https://
ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/strategic-notes/enter-data-economy_en. 
11 Roland T. Rust, P.K. Kannan, and N. Peng, “The customer economics of internet privacy”, 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 30 (2002), 455-464.
12 Howard A. Shelanski, “Information, innovation, and competition policy for the internet”, 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 161 (2013): 1665 argues that data is especially valuable to 
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There are several activities concerning big data, such as collection, stor-
age, synthesis, analysis and usage.13 For this reason, some authors high-
light the existence of a “data value chain”.14 In this context, it is possible to 
observe a “productive chain” that supports a variety of stakeholders and 
technologies.15 
Consumers can benefit from new services of data-driven markets.16 
However, there are many privacy concerns that may arise therefrom, such 
as unauthorised collection and use of personal data, invasive marketing, 
spam and misleading advertising. 
Before analysing the tools, and in order to address privacy concerns aris-
ing from big data-driven economy, I will highlight some aspects of the 
two-sided markets model. 
2. Platforms and multi-sided markets 
Most digital economy services are provided through platforms which 
operate under the two-sided market model. In this kind of market, an 
intermediary (commonly referred to as a platform) enables interactions 
between two or more sides.17 
platforms because: “(1) digital platforms generally have much greater access than conventional 
businesses to a broad range of information about their consumers, and (2) digital businesses may 
be better able to process and use that data for a variety of purposes”.
13 Edward Curry, “The big data value chain: Definitions, concepts, and theoretical approaches”, in 
New Horizons for a Data-Driven Economy, ed. José Maria Cavanillas, Edward Curry and Wolfgang 
Wahlster (Switzerland: Springer, 2016), 29-38.
14 H. Gilbert Miller and Peter Mork, “From data to decisions: A value chain for big data”,  IT 
Professional 15, no 1 (2013), 57, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/260305818_From_
Data_to_Decisions_A_Value_Chain_for_Big_Data.
15 Benjamin T. Hazen et. al., “Data quality for data science, predictive analytics, and big data in 
supply chain management: An introduction to the problem and suggestions for research and 
applications”, International Journal of Productions Economics 154 (2014): 72-80, https://www.sci-
encedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0925527314001339?via%3Dihub. 
16 OECD, Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being Interim Synthesis Report (2017), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/data-driven-innovation-interim-synthesis.pdf.
17 Jean Tirole, Economics for the Common Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 
379. He defines two-sided markets as follows: “That is, a market in which an intermediary (Visa, 
Sony, Alphabet, Facebook, and the real estate agency) enables sellers and buyers to interact. These 
“platforms” bring together different communities of users seeking to interact with each other – for 
example, players and developers of games in the case of the videogame industry, the users of oper-
ating systems (Windows, Android, Linus or OSX on your Mac or iOS in your iPhone) and applica-
tion developers; users and advertisers in the case of search engines and media; or holders of bank 
cards and merchants in the case of card transactions. These platforms bring both groups together 
and also provide a technological interface allowing them to interact”.
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There are several examples of multi-sided platforms, like social networks, 
payment cards, search engines, marketplaces, dating clubs or applications, 
shopping centres, softwares, video games consoles, accommodation sys-
tems and passengers transport companies. So, most of the most popular 
digital economy industries operate as multi-sided platforms.18 
These companies act in different segments but have a common aspect: 
the key importance of their users’ data. Through data collection and analy-
sis, they develop the best strategies to attract the largest possible number of 
users on the distinct sides of the market and promote a more effective and 
profitable interaction.
The platform connects the parties, often validating transactions between 
them.19 A good example are the credit card companies, which work as a 
platform to connect one side (the credit card holder) with the other side 
(the merchant or service provider).20 
Notwithstanding, there are platforms which establish links with various 
sides, such as social networks like Facebook. In this context, each holder 
of a Facebook account can be considered as a side that exchanges publica-
tions on the platform. Another essential agent is the advertiser, who pays 
to advertise products and services on the Facebook platform. 
The remuneration of the platform comes from price charged on both 
sides of the market. For example, credit cards companies usually charge 
both the cardholder (via membership dues) and the merchant or the ser-
vice provider (via payment of a fee over the amount received). 
However, the administrator often exempts the cardholder of the annual 
fee (in contrast to a previous financial relationship or the use of a certain 
amount). 
There are arrangements in which the non-recovery of one side is the rule. 
For example, social networks and search engines charge only the adver-
tiser. However, these services are not cost-free for consumers.
Firstly, because usually the side that pays the platform passes the amount 
paid to the final consumer, embedding such cost in the final price of the 
product sold or service rendered. In fact, the amount paid by the merchant 
18 David S. Evans, “Some empirical aspects of multi-sided platform industries”, Review of Network 
Economics 2, no. 3 (2003): 191-209.
19 See: Mark Armstrong, “Competition in two-sided markets”, RAND Journal of Economics 37, no. 
3 (2006): 668-691.
20 Lapo Filistrucchi, Geradin Damien and Eric Van Damme, “Identifying two-sided markets”, 
TILEC Discussion Paper no. 2012-008 (2012), 3, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2008661. 
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to the credit card administrator comes embedded in the final price of the 
product sold to the consumer. 
The same reasoning is applied if only the advertiser remunerates the plat-
form (as occurs in social networks, in the provision of search on the internet, 
or in messaging or geolocation applications): the amount paid for advertis-
ing is embedded in the final price of the advertised product or service. 
Furthermore, final consumers must provide something valuable, though 
not expressed directly in monetary terms: their personal data. The amount 
of data required in return, as well as the extent of the consent to the pro-
cessing of data will vary in each case. Nevertheless, any kind of consum-
ers’ personal data will always be required and the transparency and the 
amount of its collection and processing will be a characteristic of every 
service integrating the quality perceived by costumers. 
Consumers benefit from new services of data-driven markets, like social 
networks or internet search engines without paying money. Nevertheless, 
it is not true that the providers offer free services, since they require cos-
tumers’ data in order to analyse, monetise and disseminate it. 
A very important aspect of the competitive dynamics of the platforms 
that operate in two-sided markets is the fact that they benefit from net-
work externalities, i.e., the positive effects that are generated when a large 
number of economic agents use the network operated by the platform. In 
other words, the more agents use the network on either side, the greater 
the value the network. 
One good example is search engine service. What the user expects is the 
appearance of good search results. For example, web pages that explain the 
functioning of a product the consumer wishes to purchase. The faster and 
more accurate the search results, the greater will be the user satisfaction.
Search engine services work with algorithms that select the appearance 
of the search results. The higher the number of users, the better the search 
service, which “learns” from users’ experience. Therefore, in the example 
chosen, the more users do product research, the more search results will 
be improved. 
Finally, advertisers want the largest possible number of users watching 
the advertising of their products and services. It is logical that they prefer 
search engine platforms that have the greatest number of users, being will-
ing to pay a higher price.
Another example is the service provided by transportation network 
companies. Consumers benefit from it if there is a large supply of drivers, 
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as this may provide faster transport. Drivers want the largest possible 
number of consumers on the other side of the market, since it will increase 
the demand for their services. 
Thus, network effects tend to foment concentrated markets, because 
platforms benefit from a high number of users, making it much more dif-
ficult for competitors with small number of users. 
This explains the existence of markets with a dominant company, as is 
the case with search engine services, social networking, messenger ser-
vices, marketplaces, etc. 
In this context, antitrust authorities should dedicate special attention 
to markets with such characteristics, mainly when analysing mergers and 
conducts involving dominant firms.21
This reality makes it difficult to assess effects of anti-competitive merg-
ers or conducts involving service providers in the digital economy.22 This 
is because often the disadvantage can occur exclusively on one side of the 
market. So, it is very important to analyse merger effects on both sides of 
the market.
Normally, antitrust agencies analyse the impact on the side that pays for 
the product or service and could suffer negative effects with the concentra-
tion subject to merger control.23 
When mergers reduce the welfare of the zero-price side, it becomes more 
difficult for antitrust authorities to assess the negative impact, since the 
tools used by competition authorities have been developed to analyse the 
price effects. Therefore, competition agencies have substantial difficulties 
in analysing impact in other dimensions, such as the quality of the service 
provided.
This characteristic heavily hinders assessment by competition authori-
ties, because the traditional instrumental analysis of mergers is based on 
21 Lina Khan, “Amazon’s antitrust paradox”. Yale Law Journal 126, no. 3 (2016-2017): 712-805, 
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/e.710.Khan.805_zuvfyyeh.pdf. 
22 Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien, “Chicken & egg: Competition among intermediation ser-
vice providers”, RAND Journal of Economics 34, no. 2 (2003), https://ssrn.com/abstract=406691.
23 See: Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “Looking up in the data-driven economy”, University 
of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper no. 333 (2017), 1, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2975510. The 
authors highlight that “the super-platforms can squeeze millions of sellers, including photogra-
phers, photojournalists, writers, journalists and musicians. Our competition laws deal with this 
kind of buyer power. These concerns, however, are often low on the enforcement agenda due to 
the indirect effects on ‘consumer welfare’, which is often measured by the price you pay for the 
goods or service. So, if we stream the YouTube video ostensibly for ‘free’, the assumption is that 
our welfare is maximized. In the digital age, as this essay argues, that urgently needs to change”.
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the investigation of the effects on the price. For example, the “hypothetical 
monopolist” test is focused on substitution in response to a small but sig-
nificant and non-transitory increase in price to define the relevant market.
Price is the central element of the last phase of the merger control pro-
cess. Indeed, if it is found that the merger restricts competition in the rel-
evant market with significant barriers to entry, competition authorities 
must investigate the net effects of the concentration. In this phase, anti-
trust authorities analyse whether restrictions on competition are higher or 
lower than the efficiencies generated by the merger.
At this stage, the most accepted test is the price standard, which simulates 
the behaviours of the post-merger price. Compensatory efficiency must be 
either sufficiently high for the post-merger price to remain unchanged, or 
lower than the pre-merger price. 
In fact, the 2010 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines adopted the con-
sumer welfare criterion, establishing that mergers cannot be approved if 
they generate price increase.24
The European “Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers 
under the Council regulation on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings” make it clear that efficiencies must be of a compensatory 
nature: they should overcome the harmful effects brought by the reinforce-
ment of the dominant position and cannot harm consumers. The docu-
ment establishes that efficiency gains must benefit consumers, be merger-
specific, and be verifiable.25
Brazilian Competition Law allows efficiency gains to be used as a jus-
tification for mergers and acquisitions that restrain competition but, on 
the other hand, it requires the transfer of a relevant part of the benefits 
resulting from economics efficiencies to consumers (art. 88, § 6, II of Law 
12.529/2011). Thus, in coherence with Law 12.529/2011, Brazilian horizon-
tal mergers guidelines (“Guideline H”) adopt the criterion of preserving 
consumer welfare in the analysis of efficiencies.26
24 See: Russell W. Pittman, “Consumer surplus as the appropriate standard for antitrust 
enforcement”, Competition Policy International 3, no. 2 (2007): 205-224, https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1075463. 
25 European Commission, Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council 
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, (2004/C 31/03), paragraph 78, 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52004XC0205%2802%29. 
26 Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica, Guia para Análise de Atos de Concentração 
Horizontal, (2006), 45-46, http://www.cade.gov.br/acesso-a-informacao/publicacoes-institucion-
ais/guias_do_Cade/guia-para-analise-de-atos-de-concentracao-horizontal.pdf/view. 
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In this context, a merger that could lead to price increase cannot be 
allowed in Europe, the United States or Brazil.
If no price is charged, though, how can the effects caused by a merger 
be analysed? A possible answer would be to investigate the effects on the 
privacy policy of the merged companies.
A first justification that can be offered to support this hypothesis is that 
the privacy policy integrates the quality of the service or product affected 
by the merger.
Additionally, it is also possible to affirm that the data collected and the 
consent to its treatment would integrate the non-monetary counterpart 
provided by the consumer. In this context, a second justification is that the 
“price” paid by consumers could be affected by the merger.
A major obstacle faced by competition authorities is that the analy-
sis methodology is excessively focused on the investigation of the con-
sequences of the merger on the monetary price.27 The difficulty is not 
restricted to the data-driven economy, because even in relation to tradi-
tional products or services the use of different analytical methodologies 
is claimed.
For example, the use of a consumer choice approach is advocated in cases 
where the price is not the main competitive variable of a given market. Its 
defenders sustain that the central objective of antitrust would be to protect 
the options essential for the consumer, related not only to price, but also 
to variety, innovation and quality. Such a paradigm would be applicable 
in non-price competition markets, especially in regulated sectors subject 
to tariffs, and in markets in which creativity and innovation are more rel-
evant to competitiveness than price.28
Consequently, antitrust authorities should avoid the mistake of only 
analysing the impact on the price charged to one side assuming that there 
will be no effect on the other side.29 
27 Competition authorities have developed tools to investigate whether economic efficiencies 
emerging from concentrations benefit consumers or not. However, they do not usually analyse 
concerns related to non-economic aspects. See, with regard to the European experience, Inge 
Graef, “Blurring boundaries of consumer welfare”, in Personal Data in Competition, Consumer 
Protection and Intellectual Property Law, ed. Mor Bakhoum et al. (Berlin: Springer, 2018), 121-152.
28 Neil W. Averitt and Robert H. Lande, “Using the ‘consumer choice approach’ to antitrust law”, 
Antitrust Law Journal 74 (2007): 187 and 196.
29 Maurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016), 5. Authors affirm that: “Quality, including privacy protection, will be an 
important aspect of non-price competition. When competition agencies solely focus on the ‘paid’ 
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As already exposed, even if there is direct payment only by one side, the 
other side is also charged, since the amount paid to the platform is embed-
ded into the final price of the product or service.30 
In addition, there is an important direct payment of consumers to the 
platform: the collection and processing of their personal data. In this 
sense, it is possible to consider data as a new currency.
There is also another way for consumers to “pay” for the service or prod-
uct delivered by the platform: their attention.31 Indeed, consumers’ atten-
tion is fundamental to the advertising market, which generates a positive 
externality: the more consumers use the platform, the more attractive it 
will be for vendors and advertisers.32 There is a clear network effect: plat-
forms with a large number of users (or viewers) are more attractive to 
advertisers and tend to be dominant.33 
The possibility of conflict of interest is another argument to support the 
thesis that antitrust authorities must analyse effects on all sides. For exam-
ple, if the merger reduces the offer of platforms, it may eliminate incentives 
for less aggressive practices of data collection and treatment. 
Imagine that, for example, the dominant platform acquires a smaller 
competitor that adopts practices to collect less data and not process the 
data collected, adopting a privacy by design model.34 It is probable that the 
dominant platform adopts a more extensive data collection and process-
ing, including its transference to third parties. 
Eventually, many consumers choose the smaller platform to preserve 
their privacy. Thus, the merger will bring a disadvantage to the consumer: 
the elimination of a competitor that has better practices in relation to data 
collection and processing. 
advertising side of these multi-sided markets, and ignore the merger’s impact on the ‘free’ side, 
both consumers and advertisers are harmed”.
30 Daniel L. Rubinfeld and Michal S. Gal, “The hidden costs of free goods: Implications for anti-
trust enforcement”, Antitrust Law Journal 80 (2016): 521-562.
31 Tim Wu, The Attention Merchants: The Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 2016), 16.
32 David S. Evans, “Attention to rivalry among online platforms and its implications for antitrust 
analysis”, Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Working Paper no. 627, (2013), 5, https://
chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1067&context=law_and_economics. 
33 John M. Newman, “Antitrust in zero-price markets: Foundations”, University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 164, no. 1 (2015): 174. 
34 The concept of privacy by design is developed by Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design in Law, 
Policy and Practice: A White Paper for Regulators, Decision-Makers and Policy-Makers, (2011). 
http://www.ontla.on.ca/library/repository/mon/25008/312239.pdf. 
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Obviously, such privacy by default practice is part of the quality of the 
service provided by the platform, and in this hypothetical case the merger 
would lead to a negative effect on quality.
Platforms are large data gatherers, undertaking various activities related 
to data processing, such as analysis, transmission to third parties, custom-
isation and conversion into targeted advertising, among others. 
A merger that strengthens the dominant position of companies involved 
can reduce incentives for the adoption of privacy policies that favour 
consumers. Antitrust authorities should investigate if the restriction to 
competition will bring negative effects on data processing consistent with 
the withdrawal of incentives to adopt more consumer-friendly privacy 
policies.35
Therefore, privacy policy is a central aspect in the relationship of the 
platform with its users which deserves special attention on the part of 
competition policy authorities, which should use methods other than tra-
ditional analysis in cases where there is no financial counterpart. 
3. Assessment of market power
Market power is a company’s position of preponderance in the relevant 
market, influencing the conduct of competitors or subtracting their influ-
ence through an independent conduct.36 
Market power is usually associated with a company’s capacity to influ-
ence a competition dynamic in order to be able to set its prices above the 
marginal cost.37
Normally, competition law uses the term dominant position as a syn-
onym of market power and establishes objective criteria to measure its 
existence.
Brazilian competition law, for example, defines dominant position as 
follows: 
35 Maurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy, 51 affirm that: “The 
fundamental problem in these (data-driven) markets is that consumers lack viable alternatives. 
Here we see the core concern of competition policy’ – namely the accumulation of market power 
– intersect with privacy concerns. The reason why market forces have not yielded the privacy pro-
tections that individuals desire is the absence of meaningful competition”.
36 Paula Forgioni, Os Fundamentos do Antitruste (São Paulo: Revista dos Tribunais, 2018), 28.
37 Jean Tirole, Economics for the Common Good, 357. The author coined the following definition: 
“market Power – that is, a firm’s ability to set its prices substantiality above its costs or to offer poor-
quality services without losing many customers”.
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“A dominant position is assumed when a company or group of companies 
is able to unilaterally or jointly change market conditions or when it controls 
20% (twenty percent) or more of the relevant market, provided that such 
percentage may be modified by CADE38 for specific sectors of the economy”.39
Only the abuse of dominant position is prohibited in Brazil. In accord-
ance with § 1 of article 36 of the Brazilian Competition Law, achieving 
dominance in a market by a natural process and by being the most effi-
cient economic agent in relation to competitors does not characterise an 
antitrust violation.
Aligned with Brazil, EU competition law does not forbid holding a domi-
nant position, since it can be obtained by legitimate business strategies and 
merits. Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) prohibits only the abuse, not the holding of a dominant position.40
Therefore, a dominant firm could perfectly compete on the merits,41 
but has a special responsibility to avoid distortion of competition on the 
market.42 
Although there is no definition in article 102 (ex-article 82 of the Treaty), 
the Court of Justice of the European Union has established the following 
concept of dominant position:
“(…) relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertak-
ing, which enables it to prevent effective competition being maintained on 
the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an appreciable 
extent independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of the 
consumers”.43
38 Brazilian competition authority (CADE – Administrative Council for Economic Defense). 
39 Article 36, § 2 of Law no. 12.529 of November 30, 2011 (Brazilian Competition Law).
40 European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, (2009/C 45/02), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52009XC0224%2801%29. 
41 Nicolas Petit, “From formalism to effects? – The Commission’s communication on enforcement 
priorities in applying article 82 EC”, World Competition: Law and Economics Review, forthcoming. 
(2009): 1-19, https://ssrn.com/abstract=1476082.
42 Thomas Eilmansberger, “How to distinguish good from bad competition under article 82 EC: In 
search of clearer and more coherent standards for anti-competitive abuses”, Common Market Law 
Review 42 (2005): 129-177.
43 Judgment of 14 February 1978, United Brands Company and United Brands Continental BV v. 
Commission, Case 27/76, ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, paragraph 65, and Judgment of 13 February 1979, 
Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, Case 85/76, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, paragraph 38. 
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Normally, market power assessment is associated with market share. In 
this context, a firm holds a dominant position whether it has a significant 
share of the relevant market. However, market power is not an absolute 
term, but a matter of degree that will depend on the circumstances of each 
case.44 
There are situations in which market share would not be a good proxy 
to measure market power. For example, the hypothesis of a new entrant 
in the relevant market which has a dominant position in another market 
vertically integrated.
Yet, the purpose of the topic is not to analyse all the possibilities of mar-
ket power measurement,45 but to support the argument that a dominant 
position cannot be established on the sole basis of large market shares. 
There are other elements that should be analysed: in data-driven mar-
kets, it is important to consider companies’ ability to collect and process 
data as an element of market power. 
Nevertheless, there are scholars who understand that data collection 
cannot be considered as a source of dominant position, because data is 
ubiquitous, inexpensive,46 non-exclusive and non-rivalrous.47 In this con-
text, data control cannot be considered a barrier to entry because it can 
easily be collected.48
On the other hand, a joint report by the French  Autorité de la 
Concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt offers several arguments 
defending that data can be a source of market power. The essay highlights 
the importance of data variety to provide competitiveness on the market, 
understanding that data processing could result in entry barriers when 
44 Office of Fair Trade, Assessment of Market Power, December 1st, 2004, https://assets.publishing.
service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284400/oft415.pdf. 
45 For example, linkage of market failures, in special imperfect information, with dominant posi-
tion. See: Robert H. Lande, “Market power without a large market share: The role of imperfect 
information and other  ‘consumer protection’ market failures”. American Antitrust Institute 
Working Paper no. 07-06, (2007): 1-18, https://www.justice.gov/atr/market-power-without-large-
market-share-role-imperfect-information-and-other-consumer-protection.
46 Catherine Tucker, “The implications of improved attribution and measurability for antitrust and 
privacy in online advertising markets”, George Mason Law Review 20 no. 4 (2013): 1025-1034.
47 D. Daniel Sokol and Roisin E. Comerford, “Antitrust and regulating big data”, George Mason 
Law Review 23, no. 5 (2016): 1129-1162.
48 Darren S. Tucker and Hill Wellford, “Big mistakes regarding big data”, The Antitrust Source, 
(December 2014): 1-12,  https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_
source/dec14_tucker_12_16f.authcheckdam.pdf.
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new entrants are unable either to collect data or to buy the same kind of 
data.49 
Moreover, in several data-driven markets, companies having the ability 
to collect and process data more efficiently than their competitors as one of 
their competitive differentials quickly obtain a dominant position.50
Data collection and processing can be a vehicle for price discrimina-
tion, facilitate collusion when companies use the data to fix prices with 
algorithms,51 and contribute to the stability and prevalence of cartels that 
use big data.52 
There is also intense use of data to improve the performance of com-
panies, to differentiate themselves from competition and to develop new 
products and services. 
In this context, it is important to discuss whether data collection, storage 
and processing can be an expression of economic power.53
There is no administrative or jurisdictional case in Brazil that has dis-
cussed data as a source of market power. In addition, there is no proposal 
to change the Brazilian legal definition of dominant position. 
On the other hand, Germany has amended its legislation to stipulate 
new hypotheses of market power related to data collection and storage.
49 Autorité de la Concurrence and  Bundeskartellamt. Competition Law and Data (2016), 23. 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%20Data%20Papier.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
50 A good example is the company Wase. According to the British antitrust authority, it was the 
ability to collect and process data more quickly and efficiently than competitors that gave the com-
pany a significant market share in mapping service in the United Kingdom, motivating the high 
value of its Acquisition by Google. See: Office of Fair Trade, Completed acquisition by Motorola 
Mobility Holding (Google, Inc.) of Waze Mobile Limited, ME/6167/13, November 11, 2013, https://
assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/555de2cfed915d7ae2000027/motorola.pdf. 
51 The focus of this article are the consequences of holding a large amount of data in the analysis 
of unilateral mergers and unilateral conducts. Therefore, it will not address the important topic 
of facilitation of collusions through data exchange, a theme that has received increasing attention 
from the antitrust authorities. On the topic see, for example: OECD, Algorithms and Collusion: 
Competition Policy in the Digital Age (2017), www.oecd.org/competition/algorithms-collusion-
competition-policy-in-the-digital-age.htm. 
52 Simonetta Vezzoso, “Competition policy in a world of big data”, in Research Handbook on Digital 
Transformations, ed. F. Xavier Olleros and Majlinda Zhegu (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2016), 
400, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2717497.
53 Marc Bourreau, Alexandre de Streel and Inge Graef, “Big data and competition policy: Market 
power, personalised pricing and advertising”, Centre on Regulation in Europe (February 16, 2017): 
7-61, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2920301.
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Indeed, Germany enacted the ninth Amendment of the Federal Act 
against Restraints of Competition, which entered into force on 9th June 
2017. One of the new provisions establishes data as a source of market 
power. Indeed, § 18 of the German Act defines the following hypotheses of 
market dominance:
“(3a) In particular in the case of multi-sided markets and networks, 
in assessing the market position of an undertaking account shall also be 
taken of:
1. direct and indirect network effects,
2.  the parallel use of services from different providers and the switching 
costs for users,
3.  the undertaking’s economies of scale arising in connection with 
network effects,
4. the undertaking’s access to data relevant for competition,
5. innovation-driven competitive pressure”.
The amendment updated the current German law to address typical 
concerns of the digital economy – the German Act, therefore, refers to 
network effects, economies of scale, costs for consumers, pressures related 
to technological innovations and, notably, access to data relevant for com-
petition as factors that characterise market domination.
Furthermore, there is express reference to the increase of platforms’ mar-
ket power by network effects. When referring to switching costs, German 
law cares about the two sides linked by a platform with a dominant posi-
tion. Such a perspective reinforces the argument that the antitrust author-
ity needs to consider the impact on both sides of the market for possible 
mergers or conducts involving platforms with a dominant position.54
54 Beiten Burkhardt, “The new German competition law in a nutshell”, Lexology, June 26, 2017, 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=535d2bda-4598-413d-86c6-05b592b1c7b5. 
The author clarifies that: “However, there was a bit of a debate in Germany whether a market with-
out direct monetary considerations is a market at all. The amendment’s answer is ‘Yes, a market 
without direct monetary considerations is a market for competition law purposes’. This clarifica-
tion strengthens the legal basis for investigating abusive practices in platform markets”.
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4. Merger notification threshold
There are acquisitions with potential impact on competition which skip 
merger control for not meeting the notification thresholds. Such circum-
stance is not unique of the digital economy or companies operating with 
big data; however, it assumes a larger dimension within such markets, 
characterised by innovation and rapid expansion of the leaders.
For example, the merger between Facebook and WhatsApp did not 
meet the thresholds in several national jurisdictions of Europe given that 
the companies involved had low revenues. The European Commission 
reviewed the merger only because there had been meeting notification 
thresholds in more than three countries of the European Union. 
In Brazil, the mentioned merger did not meet the legal notification 
thresholds and was therefore not reported to the antitrust authority 
(Administrative Council for Economic Defense – CADE). 
Brazilian notification thresholds are based exclusively on the combined 
annual local turnovers of the companies involved in the merger. 
Thus, in accordance with article 88 of Law no. 12.529, enacted in November 
30, 2011, a merger must be submitted to the Brazilian Federal antitrust 
authority if: I – at least one of the groups involved in the transaction has 
registered, in the last balance sheet, annual gross sales or total turnover in 
the country, in the year preceding the transaction, equivalent or superior 
to four hundred million reais (R$ 400,000,000.00, or US$ 100,000,000,00); 
and cumulatively, II – at least another group involved in the transaction has 
registered, in the last balance sheet, gross annual sales or total turnover in 
the country, in the year preceding the transaction, equivalent to or greater 
than thirty million reais (R$ 30,000,000.00 or US$ 8,000,000.00).
Brazilian law allows an inter-ministerial decree of the Ministries of 
Finance and Justice to modify the turnover amount. On 30 May 2012, 
Decree no. 994 was enacted, which increased the combined notification 
thresholds to seven hundred and fifty million reais (R$ 750,000,000.00 or 
US$ 200,000,000.00) for the one group and seventy-five million reais (R$ 
75,000,000.00 or US$ 200,000.00) for the other group involved. 
Several other mergers which could have an impact on competition were 
not notified because they did not fit the criteria for notification, since they 
had no significant revenues registered in Brazil in the specific moment of 
the transaction. 
In addition, there has been the phenomenon of acquisitions of start-up 
companies with low income by larger companies. In these cases, normally 
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the combined threshold criteria are not met, and such mergers are not 
notifiable, therefore not being subject to review by the Brazilian competi-
tion authority (CADE). 
Such blind spots in merger notification rules are especially verifiable 
within the digital economy sector due to the dynamism in which new 
market niches appear and start-ups have a fertile field for growth and are 
frequently acquired by larger companies before they reach a high turnover.
In Brazil, although there are scholars who express concern about the 
topic, especially in relation to the strategy of large companies acquire small 
firms with revenues below the minimum parameter and thus do not need 
to notify the operation55, there is no initiative in the Brazilian Congress for 
modification so far. 
So, even if it is not an exclusive problem, there is no doubt that the blind 
spots of the threshold notification rules particularly affect relevant mar-
kets associated with the digital economy and, even more specifically, those 
that are big-data driven.56
In Europe, it is worth noting the recent modification carried out in 
German legislation, whose main alteration was the addition of the value 
of the transaction. 
One of the amendments to the Act against Restraints of Competition 
added a transaction value threshold. In accordance with § 35 of the 
German Law, which regulates the scope of application of the control of 
Concentrations: 
“(1) The provisions on the control of concentrations shall apply if in the 
last business year preceding the concentration 
1. the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings 
concerned was more than EUR 500 million, and 
2. the domestic turnover of at least one undertaking concerned was 
more than EUR 25 million and that of another undertaking concerned 
was more than EUR 5 million. 
55 Ana Frazão, “Big data e impactos sobre a análise concorrencial: Preocupações que já se vislumbram 
no cenário atual”. Jota, 7 February 2018. https://www.jota.info/?pagename=paywall&redirect_
to=//www.jota.info/opiniao-e-analise/colunas/constituicao-empresa-e-mercado/big-data-e-
impactos-sobre-analise-concorrencial-2-07022018. 
56 Tim Wu, “Blind spot: The attention economy and the law”, Antitrust Law Journal, forthcoming 
(2017): 2-40, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2029.
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(1a) The provisions on the control of concentrations shall also apply if 
1. the requirements of paragraph 1 no. 1 are fulfilled, 
2. in the last business year preceding the concentration a) the domestic 
turnover of one undertaking concerned was more than EUR 25 million 
and 
b) neither the target undertaking, nor any other undertaking concerned 
achieved a domestic turnover of more than EUR 5 million, 
3. the consideration for the acquisition exceeds EUR 400 million and 
4. the target undertaking pursuant to no. 2 has substantial operations 
in Germany”. 
The new threshold allows merger control in Germany to apply to acqui-
sitions of start-up companies with innovative business models which have 
a low turnover at the time of the merger but have potential to assume an 
important position in the market in the future.
The new German criterion is inspired by the United States of America, 
whose legislation adopts two types of notification thresholds: the “size-of-
person” test and the “size-of-transaction” test. The value of the thresholds 
is adjusted annually in accordance with changes in the gross national prod-
uct. The revised thresholds announced by the Federal Trade Commission 
in 2018 are: 1 – Acquisitions valued at $84.4 million or less are not sub-
ject to notification; 2 – transactions valued at more than $337.6 million 
must be notified regardless of the size of companies; and 3 – merges valued 
between $84.4 million and $337.6 million are reportable only if the size-of-
person test is met.57 
Austria has also included a similar update of its merger control thresh-
olds in its planned legislative amendment package.
The new amended regime, which is in force since 1 November 2018, 
introduces an additional transaction value test. Besides the turnover rule, 
a transaction must be submitted to the Austrian Cartel Office if in the 
business year preceding the transaction:
“The combined worldwide turnover of the undertakings exceeds €300 
million (US$352.1 million); and
57 Federal Trade Commission, Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act, 
January 29, 2018, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/federal_register_notices/2018/01/
revised_jurisdiction_7a_1-29-18.pdf.
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The combined Austrian turnover of the undertakings exceeds €15 
million (US$17.6 million); and
The value of the consideration paid in return for the transaction exceeds 
€200 million (US$234.7 million); and
The target is active in Austria to a significant extent”.
Thus, the amendment passed in Austrian and German antitrust laws 
allows National Competition Authorities to pursue a more active role in 
merger control of big data companies. The introduction of the size-of-
transaction test allows competition authorities to review acquisitions of 
small companies carried out by dominant firms, as well as the entry oper-
ation in the national geographic market of a company with a dominant 
position in its original geographic market, if these operations meet the 
new notification thresholds.
5. Big Data merger control
A very controversial issue is whether the analysis of the effects on con-
sumer privacy should integrate the review of mergers involving big data 
companies, i.e., firms that act as data gatherers and data processors in the 
development of their activities. 
There is a wide divergence as regards the scope of the analysis of antitrust 
authorities in big-data-driven mergers. Should the analysis of competition 
authorities reach concerns related to consumer privacy? Alternatively, 
should merger control analyse only possible effects of the merger on the 
price of services or products of big data companies? 
5.1. Pros and cons of privacy on merger control 
A strong argument against a proactive surveillance of competition author-
ities in data protection issues is the large list of benefits brought by Big 
Data.58 In this regard, antitrust policy would not be appropriate for deal-
ing with privacy concerns. Consumer protection or data protection laws 
(if existing) would be better tools for addressing big data privacy issues.59
58 Darren S. Tucker and Hill Wellford, “Big mistakes regarding big data”, The Antitrust Source, 
(2014), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/dec14_
tucker_12_16f.authcheckdam.pdf. The authors highlight that: “Big data and analysis increase 
economic output, reduce crime, improve public health and safety, increase voter turnout, boost 
energy efficiency, improve weather forecasts, and enhance agricultural yields”.
59 D. Daniel Sokol and Roisin E. Comerford, “Antitrust and regulating big data”, George Mason 
Law Review 23, no. 5 (2016): 1129-1162. 
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A counterargument is that consumers pay by delivering their personal 
data to use services provided by dominant big data companies only because 
they have no viable alternatives. Firms with a dominant position which 
extract data from their consumers would have little incentive to invest in 
privacy protections if their competitors were too small. In this context, 
firms with strong market power would not suffer competitive pressure sig-
nificant enough to discipline their misconduct.60 
Another argument is that there is asymmetric information in the 
relationship between consumers and platforms, and consumers face a 
bounded rationality. These aspects show that despite the importance of 
the “informed decision” as a fundament of data protection regulation, this 
principle has its limits and does not protect consumers in all situations.61 
The competence to protect privacy belongs to data protection authori-
ties. However, privacy policies, which include transparency and methods 
used by companies to obtain consumer consent to data collection, as well 
as the quantity of data required, are a competitive differential.
In other words, data-driven companies have different privacy policies. 
In this context, it is not true that necessarily all businesses will adopt the 
same transparency and scope of data processing.62
Companies also compete in how and what kind of consumer data they 
capture, as well as in the indiscriminate or restricted use of the data col-
lected. A good example comes from the search engines market: a small 
company can differentiate its services from the dominant firm by offering 
users more privacy.63 
60 See: Pamela Jones Harbour and Tara Isa Koslov, “Section 2 in a Web 2.0 World: An expanded 
vision of relevant product markets”, Antitrust Law Journal 76 (2010): 785.
61 Bertin Martens, “An economic policy perspective on online platforms”, Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies Digital Economy Working Paper 2016/05 (2016): 1, https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/
sites/jrcsh/files/JRC101501.pdf. The author understands that “widespread market failure of pri-
vacy-informed decision by consumers could pave the way for regulatory intervention”.
62 The following articles argue that firms may compete by offering more transparent privacy 
policies: David S. Evans, “The online advertising industry: Economics, evolution, and privacy”, 
The Journal of Economic Perspectives 23, no. 3 (2009): 37-60, and Scott J. Savage & Donald M. 
Waldman, “Privacy tradeoffs in smartphone applications”, Economic Letters 137 (2015): 171-175.
63 For instance, Duckduckgo is a search engine that advertises privacy as its main characteristic. 
The firm promises that will not track their users, affirming that: “Too many people believe that you 
simply can’t expect privacy on the Internet. We disagree and have made it our mission to set a new 
standard of trust online”. See: https://duckduckgo.com/about. 
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In this context, privacy policy could be considered as a non-price ele-
ment of big data-driven markets, integrating the concept of service or 
product quality.64 
Two-sided markets are predominant in the digital economy, and usually 
the consumer side is not directly charged in financial terms. Still, consum-
ers pay an indirect remuneration through their personal data collection 
and processing.
Big data companies collect and process data as an essential part of their 
business model,65 which reinforces the argument that privacy could be 
considered a form of non-price competition.66
There is a subtle, but important difference between a mandate to protect 
privacy and a task to examine whether a restrictive merger that affects 
competition will have a negative impact on data collection and processing. 
It is not a crusade to transform a competition agency into a data pro-
tection authority, only an argument to include the assessment of pri-
vacy restrictions in the review of problematic mergers between big data 
companies.
In cases of merger reviews involving big data companies which could 
limit competition, it seems important to analyse not only the possible 
effects on the price alone, but also to investigate the consequences to pri-
vacy policies.
5.2. Analysis of jurisprudence
The Brazilian competition authority (CADE) has not discussed privacy 
concerns in merger control. One of the factors that have contributed to the 
absence of this debate is the fact that the most famous worldwide big data 
mergers did not meet Brazilian notification thresholds. 
In Europe, there are several examples of big data mergers reviewed by 
the European Commission. In two of them, the European Commission 
discussed the relevance of the investigation on alleged effects on privacy 
policies: Google/DoubleClick and Facebook/WhatsApp.
64 Neil W. Averitt and Robert H. Lande, “Using the ‘consumer choice’ approach to antitrust law”, 
Antitrust Law Journal 74 (2007): 175-264. The authors highlight that: “Market power also can dis-
tort non-price attributes anticompetitive even if price is unaffected”.
65 Tim Wu, “It’s time to break up Facebook”, The Verge, April 9, 2018. https://www.theverge.
com/2018/9/4/17816572/tim-wu-facebook-regulation-interview-curse-of-bigness-antitruste.
66 Maureen K.  Ohlhausen and  Alexander P. Okuliar,  “Competition,  consumer protection and 
the right (approach) to privacy”, Antitrust Law Journal 80, no. 1 (2015): 126.
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The European Commission cleared the proposal merger, adopting the 
understanding that the acquisition would not raise competition concerns 
under competition law. 
During the investigation in Europe, competition and privacy concerns 
arose focused mainly on the combination of the databases held by Google 
and DoubleClick, as well as on whether the company would have more 
incentives to track customer online behaviour for targeting purposes. The 
European Commission limited its analyses to an antitrust point of view 
and concluded that the merged database was unlikely to produce harmful 
effects on competition, either in the market for ad serving technology or in 
the market for online advertising.
The most well-known case is the acquisition of WhatsApp by Facebook. 
The European Commission defined three relevant markets: (1) consumer 
communications services, (2) social networking services, and (3) online 
advertising services. The Commission considered that the transaction did 
not give rise to serious doubts about its compatibility with the internal 
market with respect to all three relevant markets, and decided, therefore, 
not to oppose the transaction and to declare it compatible with the internal 
market and the EEA Agreement.67 
A very important aspect of the decision was that the European 
Commission recognised the importance of privacy policy as a parameter 
of competition in consumer communications services.68 
Notwithstanding, the European Commission affirmed that it would not 
investigate the privacy issues arising from the operation, namely whether 
the merger would increase the ability of Facebook to concentrate the con-
trol of personal data. The Commission understood that such investigation 
was not a task for the antitrust authority, as noted in the following excerpt 
of the reasoning adopted by the Commission:
“(164) For the purposes of this decision, the Commission has analysed 
potential data concentration only to the extent that it is likely to strengthen 
Facebook’s position in the online advertising market or in any sub-seg-
ments thereof. Any privacy-related concerns flowing from the increased 
concentration of data within the control of Facebook as a result of the 
67 European Commission, Case M.7217, Facebook/WhatsApp, October 3, 2014 http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf. 
68 European Commission, Case M.7217, paragraphs 87 and 102, and footnote 79.
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Transaction do not fall within the scope of the EU competition law rules 
but within the scope of the EU data protection rules”.69
For its part, in the Asnef-Equifax Case, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union underlined that data protection is not a competition law 
matter:
“63 Furthermore, since, as the Advocate General observed, in substance, 
at point 56 of his Opinion, any possible issues relating to the sensitivity of 
personal data are not, as such, a matter for competition law, they may be 
resolved on the basis of the relevant provisions governing data protection”.70 
Although the cited decisions did not include concerns related to personal 
data protection among the objectives of the competition policy, there are 
new positions pointing out to a convergent enforcement of the two spheres. 
In this regard, the most important precedent in merger control is the 
acquisition of LinkedIn by Microsoft. The European Commission rein-
forced its understanding that privacy is an important parameter of com-
petition in data-driven markets and expressed concern that the operation 
could restrict consumer choice and marginalise competitors with more 
user-friendly privacy policies than LinkedIn.71
The Commission decided not to oppose the Microsoft/LinkedIn merger, 
subject to full compliance with the obligations contained in the final 
commitments, which established suitable remedies that addressed anti-
competitive conglomerate effects found by the Commission during its 
investigation.72 
69 European Commission, Case M.7217, paragraph 164. 
70 Judgment of 23 November 2006, Asnef-Equifax v. Asociación de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios, 
C-238/05, EU:C:2006:734, paragraph 63.
71 European Commission, Case M.8124, Microsoft/LinkedIn, December 6, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/
competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m8124_1349_5.pdf. The Commission affirmed that: “(350) 
Second, to the extent that these foreclosure effects would lead to the marginalisation of an existing 
competitor which offers a greater degree of privacy protection to users than LinkedIn (or make the 
entry of any such competitor more difficult), the Transaction would also restrict consumer choice in 
relation to this important parameter of competition when choosing a PSN”. See, also, footnote 330: 
“The results of the market investigation have indeed revealed that privacy is an important param-
eter of competition and driver of customer choice in the market for PSN services (...). The finding of 
the importance of privacy as parameter of competition is consistent with the Commission’s findings 
in Facebook/WhatsApp (...) in relation to consumer communication services”. 
72 These remedies have behavioural nature and can be divided into two groups: integration 
Commitments and pre-installation Commitments. See: Michele Giannino, Microsoft/LinkedIn: 
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However, the most expressive changes in perspective are verified in 
investigations of anti-competitive conducts, in particular abuse of domi-
nant position, as will be detailed in the next item.
6. Privacy violation as an abuse of dominant position?
Initially, it is pertinent to highlight the position adopted by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in the Allianz Hungaria Case. The Court 
recognised that an infringement of one area of law could possibly be a fac-
tor in deciding that there has been an infringement of competition law. In 
this regard, it would be possible that a breach of data protection law could 
constitute an infringement of competition law.73
Nevertheless, the most significant proceeding related with privacy 
opened by a European competition authority is the Bundeskartellamt’s 
Facebook case,74 in which the German authority considered Facebook’s 
collection and use of data from third-party sources to be abusive and 
imposed on the company restrictions in the processing of user data.75
The relevant market was defined as the private social network market 
with private users in Germany. The Bundeskartellamt found that Facebook 
holds a dominant position, with a market share exceeding 95 per cent 
among daily active users.
Although the strongest evidence of a dominant position was the large 
market share of the company, the agency mentioned the ability to collect 
data as an element of its dominance.76
What the European Commission Said on the Competition Review of Digital Market Mergers (2017), 
1, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3005299.
73 Judgment of 14 March 2013, Allianz Hungaria and Generali-Providencia, C-32/11, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:160. 
74 Jay Modrall, “Big data and merger control in the EU”,  Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 9, no. 9 (2018): 569, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpy062. The author highlights the following 
initiatives beyond German investigation: “EU antitrust authorities have taken a leading role in explor-
ing antitrust concerns around ‘big data’. The UK CMA announced the formation of a new technol-
ogy team to keep pace with the use of algorithms, artificial intelligence and big data in 2017, and the 
French and German authorities published a joint study on big data and antitrust in 2016. Compared 
to these national authorities, the European Commission has kept a relatively low profile, although 
Commissioner Vestager has commented on big data and algorithm issues in several speeches”.
75 Bundeskartellamt, Case Summary, B6-22/16, Facebook, Exploitative business terms pursuant 
to Section 19(1) GWB for inadequate data processing. 15 February 2019. https://www.bundeskar-
tellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Fallberichte/Missbrauchsaufsicht/2019/B6-22-16.
html?nn=3600108.
76 Bundeskartellamt, Background Information on the Facebook Proceeding, 19 December, 
2017, 2. https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Diskussions_
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The German authority understood Facebook benefits from the “iden-
tity-based network effects”, because users’ criteria for the choice of a social 
network are its size and the possibility to find the persons they want to be 
in contact with on it. As a result, it is extremely difficult for consumers to 
switch to another social network (lock-in effect). 
There is also an indirect network effect favourable to Facebook: advertis-
ers prefer platforms with large numbers of users. Therefore, a competitor 
has to reach a large number of consumers to be attractive to the adver-
tising side, a task that is almost impossible on account of the identity-
based network effects. Consequently, Facebook has a quasi-monopoly in 
Germany, with a market share exceeding 95 per cent among daily active 
users. The Agency also found that there are strong barriers to market entry 
for a competitor, especially the comprehensive data sources. As a result of 
these combined factors, competitors have been experiencing a continuous 
decrease in user-based market shares over the years, and some of them 
have already left the relevant market.77
Facebook’s large dominance of the relevant market is a central aspect 
of the case on account of the absence of alternatives to consumers. The 
Bundeskartellamt considered Facebook abuses its dominant position by 
imposing unfair terms of use to its consumers: they must choose between 
accepting “the whole Facebook package”, including an extensive disclo-
sure of personal data, or not using Facebook at all. Social network users 
are locked, because there is no parallel use of social networks in Germany. 
If they want to use such kind of service, they must be Facebook consumers 
and have no other option but to agree to unfair contractual terms.
The Bundeskartellamt focused only on data obtained from third 
party sources, which include firstly services owned by Facebook such as 
WhatsApp or Instagram, and secondly websites and apps of other opera-
tors with embedded Facebook APIs (Application Programming Interfaces). 
The German authority found that “if a third-party website has embedded 
Facebook products such as the ‘like’ button or a ‘Facebook login’ option or 
analytical services such as ‘Facebook Analytics’, data will be transmitted 
Hintergrundpapiere/2017/Hintergrundpapier_Facebook.html. The antitrust agency affirmed 
that: “Facebook has superior access to the personal data of its users and other competition-relevant 
data. Because social networks are data-driven products, access to such data is an essential factor for 
competition in the market. The data are relevant for both the product design and the possibility to 
monetise the service. If other companies lack access to comparable data resources, this can be an 
additional barrier to market entry”.
77 Bundeskartellamt, Case Summary, 6.
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to Facebook via APIs the moment the user calls up that third party’s web-
site for the first time”. Even if the user has blocked web tracking in his 
browser or device settings, the data collected from third parties can be 
merged with data from the user’s Facebook account.78 
According to the Bundeskartellamt, consumers must accept the terms 
and conditions imposed by Facebook to access the service. In other words, 
the acceptance of Facebook’s data policy is mandatory. In this regard, 
there is a violation of the data protection legislation, which requires the 
voluntary consumer consent to the collection and processing of data.79 
Consequently, Facebook’s terms and conditions are neither justified 
under data protection principles nor appropriate under competition law 
standards. The Bundeskartellamt understands that if a dominant com-
pany imposes consumers’ consent to data collection and processing as a 
condition to contract the service, this can be taken as a case of “exploita-
tive business terms”, which constitutes an abuse of a dominant position to 
the detriment of both private users and competitors.
The Bundeskartellamt asserted that the dominant company should not 
practice unfair conduct against its users even if they do not pay a monetary 
price. The German antitrust authority considered that the damage to con-
sumers would be the loss of control over the use of their personal data.80 
At the time of the initiation of the proceeding, the Bundeskartellamt 
explained that a sole violation of data protection law without a direct and 
close connection with the existing dominant position on the market would 
not constitute an infringement of competition law. Therefore, a mere exist-
ence of unfair terms is not enough to characterise a competition infringe-
ment, the demonstration of a dominant position connected with the impo-
sition of abusive contractual clauses being, thus, necessary.81
78 Bundeskartellamt, Background Information on the Facebook Proceeding, 2.
79 Bundeskartellamt, Case Summary, 10-11. The German authority affirmed that: “There is no 
effective consent pursuant to Art. 6(1a) of the GDPR. The reasons for this include the fact that, 
in view of Facebook’s dominant position in the market, users consent to Facebook’s terms and 
conditions for the sole purpose of concluding the contract, which cannot be assessed as their free 
consent within the meaning of the GDPR”.
80 Bundeskartellamt, Background Information on the Facebook Proceeding, 4. The authority stated 
that: “Facebook offers its service for free. Its users therefore do not suffer a direct financial loss 
from the fact that Facebook uses exploitative business terms. The damage for the users lies in a loss 
of control: they are no longer able to control how their personal data are used”.
81 Bundeskartellamt initiates proceeding against Facebook on suspicion of having abused its mar-
ket power by infringing data protection rules. March 2, 2016. https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/
SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2016/02_03_2016_Facebook.html. 
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From a competition point of view, the Bundeskartellamt took into 
account the following elements: 1 – the dominant position of Facebook; 
2 – data accumulation as a competitive differentiation that strengthens 
such dominance; and 3 – the imposition of an unfair privacy policy by 
Facebook.82 The German Federal Cartel Agency therefore concluded that 
the conduct could be considered as a case of “exploitative business terms”, 
which is a type of abuse of dominant position under section 19(1) of the 
German competition law (GWB).83
The Bundeskartellamt based its decision on case law of the German 
Federal Court of Justice, which stated that the imposition of unfair terms 
by a company with market power is a hypothesis of abuse of a dominant 
position.84
The German antitrust authority has prohibited the data processing 
policy imposed by Facebook on its users and determined the termina-
tion of this conduct. The Bundeskartellamt has also ordered Facebook to 
implement the necessary changes and to adapt its data and cookie policies 
accordingly within a period of twelve months.85
A pertinent clarification is that the decision was formulated under the 
German legal system and based on the case law of the competent national 
court, considering the specificities of the proceeding. 
82 Giuseppe Colangelo and Mariateresa Maggiolino, “Data accumulation and the privacy-antitrust 
interface: Insights from the Facebook case for the EU and the U.S.”, TTLF Working Paper no. 31 
(2018), 15, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3125490. The authors explained 
that: “As a matter of law, aside from any privacy concerns, the Bundeskartellamt is concerned with 
two antitrust issues. First, it claims that this accumulation of data is allowing Facebook to entrench 
its dominant position: Facebook “can use [these data] to optimize its offer and tie more users to 
its network […] to the detriment of other providers of social networks”; and Facebook “is becom-
ing more and more indispensable for advertising customers […with…] [a] potential for competi-
tive harm on the side of the advertising customers”. Second, the GCA alleges that the Facebook’s 
request for a single catch-all grant of consent is unfair within the meaning of Article 102(a)”.
83 Section 19(1) of the German Act against Restraints of Competition (GWB) establishes: “The 
abuse of a dominant position by one or several undertakings is prohibited”.
84 The German Federal Court of Justice decided that an imposition of terms and conditions of 
contract that violate Sections of the German Civil Code by a company with market power is also 
an infringement of section 19 (1) of GWB (See: BGH, judgment of 6 November 2013 – KZR 58/11, 
BGHZ 199, 1, margin no. 65 – VBL-Gegenwert). 
85 Bundeskartellamt. Case Summary, 12. The prohibition refers to “the terms that involve the col-
lection of user and device related data from other corporate services and Facebook Business Tools 
without the users’ consent and their combination with Facebook data for purposes related to the 
social network”.
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Given this caveat, it is important to emphasise that the imposition of 
unfair trading conditions is one of the hypotheses of abuse of a dominant 
position established by Article 102 TFEU.86 However, there have been only 
a few precedents of European Commission’s proceedings linked to this 
legal disposition. In fact, the investigation of exploitative conducts has 
not been a priority for the European Commission in the enforcement of 
Article 102 TFEU.87 
The Facebook case represents a significant change in perspective in com-
petition law enforcement: the Bundeskartellamt has interpreted that under 
certain circumstances the violation of data protection rules by a company 
with market dominance could be considered as an abuse of dominant 
position.
Another remarkable aspect of the investigation is that the competition 
authority focused on the zero-price side of the market, i.e., the social net-
work users. Precisely the opposite of the European Commission’s analysis 
of the Google/DoubleClick case, which focused exclusively on the side of 
advertisers.88 
Nevertheless, the Bundeskartellamt decision is very controversial, being 
subject to criticism because it would be an erroneous application of com-
petition law to protect personal data.89
On the other hand, a comprehensive approach to big data concerns is 
supported by the European Data Protection Supervisor, who suggests a 
closer cooperation between data protection, consumer protection and 
antitrust authorities in the investigation and enforcement of personal data 
protection rules. The data authority urges for “a new concept of consumer 
86 Article 102 TFEU establishes that: “Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant posi-
tion within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible 
with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in 
particular, consist in: (a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions”.
87 See: European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying 
Art. 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (2009/C 
45/02), February 24, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/. 
88 Giulia Schneider, “Testing art. 102 TFEU in the digital marketplace: Insights from the  Bun-
deskartellamt’s investigation against Facebook”, Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 9, 
no. 4 (2018): 214, https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpy016. 
89 See, for example: Dirk Auer, “The FCO’s Facebook Decision: Putting privacy before competi-
tion”, CPI EU News: FCO Facebook Quadriptych (March, 2019): 1-5. https://www.competitionpoli-
cyinternational.com/cpi-eu-news-fco-facebook-quadriptych/#_edn4.
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harm for competition enforcement in digital economy” which represses 
“opaque or misleading privacy policies”.90
The joint report by the Autorité de la Concurrence  and the 
Bundeskartellamt sustains that privacy issues cannot be excluded from 
consideration under competition law simply by virtue of their nature. The 
lack of transparency on the collection and processing of personal data 
can have, in parallel, implications on competition dimension. Misleading 
privacy policies are likely to affect competition, especially when they are 
implemented by a dominant firm using data as a key input.91
In a recent report prepared for the Federal Government of Germany, 
German scholars analysed the dynamics of the market power exer-
cised on digital economy and concluded that the proceeding opened by 
Bundeskartellamt against Facebook is a good example of adequate imple-
mentation of German competition law and policy.92 
In this regard, there are strong arguments to consider the 
Bundeskartellamt’s proceeding as a correct competition law enforcement 
to penalise a new anticompetitive conduct in the digital economy.93 
However, other tools could be enforced to restrain unfair privacy poli-
cies. For example, the Italian Competition Authority (Autorità Garante 
della Concorrenza e del Mercato) imposed a fine of €3 million on 
WhatsApp because the messenger company forced its users to accept in 
full its new terms of use, specifically the provision to share their personal 
data with Facebook. WhatsApp induced its consumers to believe that 
without granting such consent they would not be able to use the service 
90 European Data Protection Supervisor, Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data: 
The Interplay between Data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection in the Digital 
Economy (2014). https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_
big_data_en.pdf. 
91 Autorité de la Concurrence and  Bundeskartellamt. Competition Law and Data (2016), 23. 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%20Data%20Papier.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2. 
92 Heike Schweitzer et al., Modernising the Law on Abuse of Market Power: Report for the Federal 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, (September 17, 2018). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3250742. 
93 Giulia Schneider, “Testing art. 102 TFEU in the digital marketplace: Insights from 
the Bundeskartellamt’s investigation against Facebook”. Journal of European Competition Law & 
Practice 9, no. 4 (2018), 213-225. https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpy016. The author affirms that: “Far 
from bending competition law to a heterogeneous task of protecting user’s personal data the BKA’s 
investigation is a welcome attempt to identify and remedy novel anti-competitive behaviour in 
digital markets”.
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anymore. The company did not inform consumers adequately that they 
could decide not to give their consent to share the information of their 
WhatsApp account with Facebook and still be able to use the application. 
The agency also closed a second investigation, this time concerning the 
alleged unfair nature of some contractual clauses included in WhatsApp 
Messenger’s “Terms of Use”, whose acceptance was imposed on its con-
sumers. The authority imposed fines in the two investigations opened 
against WhatsApp for violations of the consumer code.94 
These condemnations, however, could not be considered a change in 
perspective as in the Bundeskartellamt’s investigation, on account that 
the Italian Competition Authority also has the task to enforce the Italian 
Consumer Code. In other words, the Italian authority based its decision 
to fine WhatsApp for unfair privacy policy on infringement of the Italian 
Consumer Code, instead of competition law.95
In fact, the existence of convictions of Facebook by consumer protection 
authorities stimulates debates whether the enforcement of consumer or 
data protection legislation would be preferable to the use of competition 
law.96 
The decision issued by the Bundeskartellamt against Facebook brings 
new elements to a controversial issue: would it be possible to consider the 
imposition of unfair privacy terms by a platform with market power as a 
hypothesis of abuse of dominant position?
Even if it is possible, there is an important supplementary question: 
would it be preferable to apply consumer or personal data protection legis-
lation instead of competition law? 
The answers to these questions depend on the analysis of each concrete 
case, as well as of the legislation of each country investigating the conduct. 
Anyway, it seems pertinent to adopt a comprehensive approach to privacy 
concerns, trying to harmonise competition enforcement and consumer 
94 Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato. PS10601 CV154 – Sanzione da 3 milioni di 
euro per WhatsApp, ha indotto gli utenti a condividere i loro dati con Facebook, May 12, 2017, http://
www.agcm.it/media/comunicati-stampa/2017/5/alias-8754. 
95 Giuseppe Colangelo and Mariateresa Maggiolino, “Data accumulation and the privacy-antitrust 
interface: Insights from the Facebook Case for the EU and the U.S.”, 28.
96 See: Renato Nazzini, “Privacy and Antitrust: Searching for the (hopefully not yet lost) soul of 
competition law in the EU after the German Facebook Decision”, CPI EU News: FCO Facebook 
Quadriptych (March, 2019): 1-8, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/cpi-eu-news-
fco-facebook-quadriptych/#_edn4.
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and data protection polices in order to choose the proper way to protect 
the users of platforms with a dominant position. 
Therefore, it is important to improve and enrich traditional antitrust 
concepts and tools in order to enhance the role of competition law to max-
imise the benefits of data-driven economy. 
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